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1 Introduction
Arrow’s (1951; 1963) celebrated general possibility theorem depends crucially on three
classes of assumptions. The first class is on the rationality postulate to be satisfied
by social preference relations, which are to be constructed on the basis of individual
preference orderings. The second class is on the ethical nature of a process or rule to
be used for the purpose of constructing social preference relations. The third class is on
the informational efficiency of a process or rule for the construction of social preferences.
Arrow’s own assumption belonging to the first class is that social preference relations
should be reflexive, complete and transitive. His own assumptions belonging to the second
class are the weak Pareto principle, that is to say, the respect for unanimous individual
strict preference, and the exclusion of dictatorial decision-making power in social choice.
Finally, Arrow’s own assumption belonging to the third class is the independence of
irrelevant alternatives.
In trying to find an escape route from Arrow’s impasse, all three classes of Arrow’s
assumptions have bee subjected to critical scrutiny. Within the first class of assumptions,
it was Sen (1969) and Plott (1973) who kicked off subsequent efforts to weaken Arrow’s
full transitivity assumption to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. Quasi-transitivity, which
discards all other components of transitivity and retains only transitivity of strict pref-
erence, lies in between transitivity and acyclicity in logical strength. Unfortunately, just
to replace transitivity with quasi-transitivity did not help us much in finding an escape
route from Arrow’s impasse as long as we retained Arrow’s other assumptions with slight
strengthenings, as Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein (1972) and others have demonstrated.
Another rationality postulate that also lies in between transitivity and acyclicity in log-
ical strength was found by Suzumura (1976), to be called Suzumura consistency. This
property turned out to be more productive in finding an escape from Arrow’s impossibility,
as Bossert and Suzumura (2008) have recently shown.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the logical implications of assuming both
quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency in the presence of the other Arrow axioms
with slight strengthenings. What emerges is a full characterization of the Pareto rule
by means of the combination of quasi-transitivity, Suzumura consistency, unrestricted
domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality.
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2 Relations and coherence properties
Suppose there is a set of alternatives X containing at least three elements, that is, |X| ≥ 3
where |X| denotes the cardinality of X. Let R ⊆ X × X be a (binary) relation. For
simplicity, we write xRy instead of (x, y) ∈ R and ¬ xRy instead of (x, y) 6∈ R. The
asymmetric factor P of R is defined by
xPy ⇔ [xRy and ¬ yRx]
for all x, y ∈ X. The symmetric factor I of R is defined by
xIy ⇔ [xRy and yRx]
for all x, y ∈ X. The non-comparable factor N of R is defined by
xNy ⇔ [¬ xRy and ¬ yRx]
for all x, y ∈ X.
If R is interpreted as a weak preference relation, that is, xRy means that x is considered
at least as good as y, then P and I are the strict preference relation and the indifference
relation corresponding to R.
The following two properties are what we refer to as richness properties because they
require certain pairs of alternatives to be in a relation.
Reflexivity. For all x ∈ X,
xRx.
Completeness. For all x, y ∈ X such that x 6= y,
xRy or yRx.
The following three properties of transitivity, quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consis-
tency are coherence properties because they demand that, if certain pairs are in R, then
other pairs must be in R as well (as is the case for transitivity and quasi-transitivity) or
other pairs cannot be in R (as is the case for Suzumura consistency).
Transitivity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[xRy and yRz] ⇒ xRz.
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The transitive closure tc(R) of a relation R is the smallest transitive relation containing
R. That is, letting N denote the set of all natural numbers, define, for all x, y ∈ X,
x tc(R) y ⇔ [∃K ∈ N and x0, . . . , xK ∈ X such that
x = x0, xk−1Rxk ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and xK = y].
Clearly, xRy implies x tc(R) y for all x, y ∈ X because the case K = 1 is possible in the
definition of the transitive closure.
The next coherence property requires that the asymmetric factor P of R be transitive.
Quasi-transitivity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[xPy and yPz] ⇒ xPz.
Finally, Suzumura consistency rules out the existence of preference cycles with at least
one strict preference.
Suzumura consistency. For all x, y ∈ X,
x tc(R) y ⇒ ¬ yPx.
Transitivity implies quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency. If R is reflexive and
complete, transitivity and Suzumura consistency are equivalent, whereas transitivity re-
mains stronger than quasi-transitivity. Without further properties, quasi-transitivity and
Suzumura consistency are independent and their conjunction does not imply transitivity.
To see that this is the case, consider the following examples. For each of them, we consider
a three-element set of alternatives X = {x, y, z}.
Example 1 Let xIy, yIz and zPx. This relation is quasi-transitive and not Suzumura
consistent.
Example 2 Let xPy and yPz. This relation is Suzumura consistent and not quasi-
transitive.
Example 3 Let xIy and yIz. This relation is quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent
and not transitive.
An ordering is a reflexive, complete and transitive relation. If R is an ordering,
there is no ambiguity in using chains of individual preferences involving more than two
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alternatives; for instance, xPyPz means that x is better than y which, in turn, is better
than z and, by the transitivity of R, x is better than z. The set of all orderings on X is
denoted by R.
As mentioned earlier, quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency are independent
properties that are implied by transitivity. For the sake of providing a comprehensive
treatment, we now identify the precise conditions that need to be added to one or both of
the weaker properties in order to arrive at a conjunction that is equivalent to transitivity.
These observations are straightforward to verify and, therefore, we do not provide formal
proofs.
First, consider quasi-transitivity. The following condition QT-complementarity is what
is needed to arrive at a conjunction that is equivalent to transitivity.
QT-complementarity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[xRy and yRz] ⇒ [xRz or (¬ yRx and ¬ zRy)].
Next, we provide a complementary condition to Suzumura consistency. Recall that
we do not impose the richness properties of reflexivity and completeness in this section in
order to identify minimally necessary complements with respect to transitivity.
SC-complementarity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[xRy and yRz] ⇒ [xRz or (z tc(R) x and ¬ yRx)
or (z tc(R) x and ¬ zRy)].
Finally, consider the case where R satisfies both quasi-transitivity and Suzumura con-
sistency. The required complementary axiom is defined as follows.
QT-SC-complementarity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[xRy and yRz] ⇒ [xRz or (¬ yRx and ¬ zRy)
or (z tc(R) x and ¬ yRx)
or (z tc(R) x and ¬ zRy)].
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It is now a matter of simple logic to prove the following result.
Theorem 1 Let R be a relation on X. The following properties are equivalent.
(1) Transitivity;
(2) Quasi-transitivity and QT-complementarity;
(3) Suzumura consistency and SC-complementarity;
(4) Quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency and QT-SC-complementarity.
Clearly, transitivity implies QT-complementarity and SC-complementarity, each of
which, in turn, implies QT-SC-complementarity. None of the axioms QT-complementarity,
SC-complementarity and QT-SC-complementarity by itself implies transitivity. This can
be demonstrated by means of examples analogous to Examples 1, 2 and 3.
An interesting weakening of Suzumura consistency is obtained if the scope of the axiom
is restricted to triples.
Triple Suzumura consistency. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[xRy and yRz] ⇒ ¬ zPx.
The corresponding complementary property with respect to transitivity now simplifies to
TSC-complementarity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[xRy and yRz] ⇒ ¬ xNz.
We can also identify a minimal property that needs to be added to the conjunction of
triple Suzumura consistency and quasi-transitivity in order to arrive at a property that is
equivalent to transitivity.
QT-TSC-complementarity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[xRy and yRz] ⇒ [¬ xNz or (¬ yRx and ¬ zRy)].
As is the case for the previous theorem, the following theorem results immediately
from the definitions of the requisite properties.
Theorem 2 Let R be a relation on X. The following properties are equivalent.
(1) Transitivity;
(2) Triple Suzumura consistency and TSC-complementarity;
(3) Quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency and QT-TSC-complementarity.
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3 Collective choice rules
Now we consider coherence properties in collective choice problems. Suppose the (finite)
population is {1, . . . , n} with n ∈ N \ {1} and the n-fold Cartesian product of R is Rn.
The set of all binary relations on X is denoted by B and T is the set of all reflexive and
transitive relations on X. Analogously, the set of all reflexive and Suzumura consistent
relations on X is denoted by C and the set of all reflexive and quasi-transitive relations
on X is Q. A (preference) profile is an n-tuple R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Rn.
A collective choice rule is a mapping f :D → B where D ⊆ Rn is the domain of this
function, assumed to be non-empty. A transitive collective choice rule is a collective choice
rule f such that f(R) ∈ T for all R ∈ D. Analogously, a quasi-transitive collective choice
rule is a collective choice rule f such that f(R) ∈ Q for all R ∈ D, a Suzumura consistent
collective choice rule is a collective choice rule f such that f(R) ∈ C for all R ∈ D, and a
quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent collective choice rule is a collective choice rule
f such that f(R) ∈ Q ∩ C for all R ∈ D. For each profile R ∈ D, R = f(R) is the social
preference corresponding to R, and P and I are the strict preference relation and the
indifference relation corresponding to R.
An example of a transitive (and, thus, quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent) col-
lective choice rule is the Pareto rule f p:Rn → B defined by Rp = f p(R), where
xRpy ⇔ [xRiy ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}]
for all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ Rn.
We use B(x, y;R) to denote the set of individuals such that x ∈ X is better than
y ∈ X in the profile R ∈ Rn, that is, for all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ Rn, B(x, y;R) =
{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | xPiy}.
The following axioms are standard in the literature on Arrovian social choice theory.
Unrestricted domain. D = Rn.
Strong Pareto. For all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ D,
(i) xRiy ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ⇒ xRy;
(ii) [xRiy ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that xPjy] ⇒ xPy.
Anonymity. For all bijections ρ: {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} and for all R,R′ ∈ D,
Ri = R′ρ(i) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ⇒ R = R′.
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Neutrality. For all x, y, x′, y′ ∈ X and for all R,R′ ∈ D,
[xRiy⇔ x′R′iy′ and yRix⇔ y′R′ix′] ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
⇒ [xRy ⇔ x′R′y′ and yRx⇔ y′R′x′].
As is straightforward to verify, the Pareto rule satisfies all of the axioms introduced above.
In Bossert and Suzumura (2008), we identified all Suzumura consistent collective choice
rules satisfying the axioms of the previous section. We state this result as a first step
toward the characterization theorem of the present paper. To define the corresponding
rules, let
S = {(w, `) ∈ {0, . . . , n}2 | |X|` < w + ` ≤ n} ∪ {(0, 0)}
and, furthermore, define
Σ = {S ⊆ S | (w, 0) ∈ S ∀w ∈ {0, . . . , n}}.
For S ∈ Σ, define the S-rule fS:Rn → B by RS = fS(R), where
xRSy ⇔ [∃(w, `) ∈ S such that |B(x, y;R)| = w and |B(y, x;R)| = `]
for all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ Rn. The set S specifies the pairs of numbers of agents
who have to consider an alternative x better (respectively worse) than an alternative y in
order to obtain a weak preference of x over y according to the profile under consideration.
Clearly, because only the number of individuals matters and not their identities, the
resulting rule is anonymous. Analogously, neutrality is satisfied because these numbers do
not depend on the alternatives to be ranked. Strong Pareto follows from the requirement
that the pairs (w, 0) be in S in the definition of Σ. Reflexivity of the social relation follows
from the reflexivity of the individual preferences and the observation that (0, 0) ∈ S for all
S ∈ Σ. As shown in Bossert and Suzumura (2008, Theorem 1), the social relation RS is
Suzumura consistent due to the restrictions imposed on the pairs (w, `) in the definition
of S. Conversely, the S-rules are the only Suzumura consistent collective choice rules
satisfying our four axioms. Thus, we obtain
Theorem 3 (Bossert and Suzumura, 2008) A Suzumura consistent collective choice
rule f satisfies unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality if and only
if there exists S ∈ Σ such that f = fS.
Clearly, the Pareto rule is the special case that is obtained for
S = {(w, 0) | w ∈ {0, . . . , n}}.
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If |X| ≥ n, this is the only S-rule. This is the case because only pairs (w, `) where ` = 0
are in S in the presence of this inequality. To see this, suppose, to the contrary, that
there exists (w, `) ∈ S such that ` > 0. Because (w, `) ∈ S, it follows that n ≥ w + ` >
|X|` > 0. Combined with |X| ≥ n, this implies n > n` which is impossible if ` > 0.
Thus, if |X| ≥ n, transitivity is implied by the conjunction of Suzumura consistency
and the axioms employed in our theorem. However, if |X| < n, the Pareto rule is not
the only S-rule. For example, consider the collective choice rule fS corresponding to
the set S = {(w, 0) | w ∈ {0, . . . , n}} ∪ {(n − 1, 1)}. For (w, `) = (n − 1, 1), we have
n = n− 1 + 1 = w + ` = n · 1 > |X|` and, thus, the relevant inequalities are satisfied.
Once rules other than the Pareto rule are available, transitivity is no longer guar-
anteed (but, of course, all S-rules are Suzumura consistent as established in Bossert
and Suzumura, 2008, Theorem 1). For example, suppose X = {x, y, z}, n = 4, S =





According to RS = fS(R), we have xP Sy and yP Sz because |B(x, y;R)| = |B(y, z;R)| =
3 and |B(y, x;R)| = |B(z, y;R)| = 1. But |B(x, z;R)| = |B(z, x;R)| = 2 and, thus,
¬ xRSz so that RS is not transitive (not even quasi-transitive). However, fS satisfies all
of our axioms and always generates reflexive and Suzumura consistent social relations.
The Pareto extension rule f e:Rn → B is defined by Re = f e(R), where
xRey ⇔ ¬ yP px
for all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ Rn. Re = f e(R) is quasi-transitive, reflexive and
complete for all R ∈ Rn. However, Re is not necessarily Suzumura consistent (and, thus,
not necessarily transitive).
The two examples mentioned above establish that Suzumura consistency of a social
relation is not implied by its quasi-transitivity and, conversely, Suzumura consistency does
not imply quasi-transitivity. Thus, requiring the social relation to possess both of these
coherence properties is a problem that has not been addressed in the earlier literature.
Sen (1969; 1970, Theorem 5*3) characterized the Pareto extension rule by weakening the
transitivity of the social ranking to quasi-transitivity while retaining the completeness
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assumption. Weymark (1984, Theorem 3) characterized the Pareto rule by imposing
transitivity but not completeness on the social relation. Our new result stated below
establishes that the conjunction of quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency implies
transitivity in the presence of our axioms even if the social relation is not complete and,
thus, we obtain a new characterization of the Pareto rule.
Sen’s (1969; 1970) and Weymark’s (1984) results are valid even without the full force of
neutrality—its well-known weakening independence of irrelevant alternatives is sufficient
for their theorems. This property is defined as follows.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives. For all x, y ∈ X and for all R,R′ ∈ D,
[xRiy ⇔ xR′iy and yRix⇔ yR′ix] ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ⇒ [xRy ⇔ xR′y and yRx⇔ yR′x].
In the absence of completeness, the requirement that social preferences be quasi-transitive
and Suzumura consistent rather than transitive, independence of irrelevant alternatives is
not sufficiently strong to characterize the Pareto rule, suppose x0, y0 ∈ X are two distinct
alternatives. Define a collective choice rule by letting
xRy ⇔ [xRpy or (¬ xRpy and ¬ yRpx and {x, y} = {x0, y0})]
for all x, y ∈ X and for all R ∈ Rn. This is a quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent
(but not transitive) collective choice rule satisfying unrestricted domain, strong Pareto,
anonymity and independence of irrelevant alternatives that differs from the Pareto rule.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives is not sufficient to imply neutrality in our set-
ting where merely quasi-transitivity and Suzumura consistency are imposed. Transitivity
of the social relation or the combination of quasi-transitivity and completeness, on the
other hand, guarantee neutrality if added to the remaining axioms and the independence
condition.
The following theorem is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 4 A quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent collective choice rule f satisfies
unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality if and only if f = f p.
Proof. That f p is a quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent collective choice rule that
satisfies the axioms of the theorem statement is immediate.
Conversely, suppose f is a quasi-transitive and Suzumura consistent collective choice
rule satisfying the axioms of the theorem statement. By Theorem 1, f is an S-rule for
9
some S ∈ Σ. It is sufficient to show that ` = 0 for all (w, `) ∈ S. By way of contradiction,
suppose this is not the case, that is, there exists (w, `) ∈ S such that ` > 0. Define
w∗ = min {w | ∃` > 0 such that (w, `) ∈ S}.
By assumption, w∗ is well-defined and by its definition, there exists `∗ > 0 such that
(w∗, `∗) ∈ S. By definition of Σ, w∗ > 2`∗ ≥ 2. By unrestricted domain and because X
contains at least three elements, we can choose three alternatives x, y, z ∈ X and a profile
R ∈ Rn such that
xPiyPiz ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , w∗ − `∗},
zPixPiy ∀i ∈ {w∗ − `∗ + 1, . . . , w∗},
yPizPix ∀i ∈ {w∗ + 1, . . . , w∗ + `∗}
and, if n > w∗ + `∗,
xIiyIiz ∀i ∈ {w∗ + `∗ + 1, . . . , n}.
We have |B(x, y;R)| = w∗ and |B(y, x;R)| = `∗ and, furthermore, |B(y, z;R)| = w∗ and
|B(z, y;R)| = `∗. Therefore, because (w∗, `∗) ∈ S, xPy and yPz. The quasi-transitivity
of R implies xPz. Because |B(x, z;R)| = w∗ − `∗ and |B(z, x;R)| = 2`∗, it follows from
the definition of an S-rule that (w∗ − `∗, 2`∗) ∈ S. This contradicts the minimality of w∗
because `∗ > 0.
4 Concluding remarks
The analysis carried out in this paper is restricted to the case of a finite population.
Allowing for an infinite population often expands the set of possible collective choice
rules considerably; see, for instance, Kirman and Sondermann (1972), Hansson (1976),
Cato (2008) and Bossert and Suzumura (2009). In the context of quasi-transitive and
Suzumura consistent collective choice rules, it remains to be checked to what extent
infinite-population variants of our results can be established.
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